

The Clergy Lifestyle Theory

by

Nick Tolson

“Clergy need Guardian Angels”



Contact


8, Commercial Road,
Shepton Mallet,
Somerset,
BA4 5DH.

Mob : 07931 353395

e mail : nick@tolson.com

Remember them.....

Reverend Christopher Gray
murdered 1996



Father Paul Orchard
Murdered 1998



Rev David Paget
Murdered 2001



Rev Ronald Glazebrook
Murdered 2002



Father Paul Bennett
Murdered 2007

The Clergy Lifestyle Theory

Assessing the risk of violence to clergy

by

Nick Tolson

Table of Contents

| | |
|----------------|----------------------------------|
| <i>Page 2</i> | 1. Introduction |
| <i>Page 3</i> | 2. Convergence of Time and Space |
| <i>Page 4</i> | 3. Motivated Offenders |
| <i>Page 11</i> | 4. Parishioners |
| <i>Page 12</i> | 5. Guardian Angels |
| <i>Page 15</i> | 6. Clergy Lifestyles |
| <i>Page 17</i> | 7. Summary |
| <i>Page 18</i> | Bibliography |

Appendix

- A Physical Security Recommendations for Clergy Homes
- B. Clergy Lifestyle Risk Assessment Sheet

1. Introduction

- 1.1 In 1979 the Routine Activity Theory (*RAT*) was developed by Cohen and Felson. This was an approach to try and explain predatory crimes. It assumes that for such crimes to occur there must be a meeting in time and space of three elements. One, a motivated offender; Two, a suitable target; Three, the absence of a guardian or protective device. The guardian can be anyone, such as a parent, co-worker or partner whose presence, simply by being present, would serve as a guardian. Often this is inadvertent but has a powerful impact against crime, reducing the chance of violence to almost zero. Should the guardian not be present then the chances of violence increases greatly.
- 1.2 When dealing with clergy we are able to explore their lifestyles and observe that there can be much similarity in how they live their lives even if the actual detail of those lives are different. Almost all clergy are on their own at certain points of the day, they travel, visit and, on occasion, pray on their own, which, in certain situations can mean that they are at very high risk of violence should they encounter the 'motivated offender'.
- 1.3 Once the risk factors that all clergy face are understood, and the local risk factors are taken into account some good practice techniques can be developed that will reduce the chance of violence and enable clergy to follow their vocation.
- 1.4 Since 1996 when Rev Christopher Gray was murdered in Liverpool there have been a total of five vicars murdered and many others seriously injured. The only academic work that has been completed on violence against clergy has been by Jonathon Gabe from the Royal Holloway, University of London in his report "*Violence against Professionals in the Community Study*" 2001. This study states that 12% of clergy suffer from physical violence, and that 70% of clergy suffer from some form of violence. These figures are significantly higher than other professional groups. In a study of 90 clergy in 2006 Nick Tolson found that 48% of them had suffered at least one violent incident in the preceding twelve months.
- 1.5 Whatever the true figure it is vital that techniques are developed, specific to clergy that allow them to follow their vocation yet keep themselves and their family safe.

2. Convergence of time and space

- 2.1 *Convergence* - It is important to recognise that clergy have one of the few jobs left where they live and work from within the community they serve. Most live in the Vicarage which is located next to or very near the church. This allows the easy identification of the clergy home and means that motivated offenders can 'converge' on the vicarage and demand the attention of the persons within. According to Gabe 50% of violent incidents occur on the doorstep of the vicarage, therefore this has to be seen as a major convergence point when looking at the interaction of victim and offender. However, the figure also means that 50% of the assaults occurred elsewhere,

mostly in the street and a statistically significant number in the church. One of the factors in the assaults away from the vicarage is the fact that clergy are easily identifiable as they tend to wear a 'clergy collar' which clearly informs people that they are a Clerk in Holy Orders. We shall look at the implications of this in detail in a paragraph below.

- 2.2 Offenders can also predict with some certainty where and when a member of the clergy is going to be present. In fact, all churches advertise this fact through the medium of the church noticeboard which gives the time of the services during the week and especially on Sunday. This allows the offender to attend the church at the appropriate time. There are also other events that the Vicar will almost certainly attend, the church fete, a visiting choir etc. However, from a parish's and the Clergy point of view it is essential that these events are advertised in order to achieve the basic purpose of a church. The advantage of these events, however, is that there are almost certainly going to be someone else present at these events so as we have seen above there will be some 'inadvertent' guardians there to protect the clergy. The problem comes when the people leave the event and the vicar is left on their own to lock up, or the service is one that no-one attends (*such as morning prayer in some churches!*) or that the offender asks the member of the clergy to speak in private after such an event. This is one of the areas where clergy will have to review their policy on such meetings and always seek the presence of a 'guardian'.
- 2.3 *Time* - Clergy are one of the few people who consider themselves 'available' 24 hrs a day. This is entirely appropriate for some situations such as someone dying or needing urgent pastoral help for a particularly difficult situation. Offenders also are aware of the tradition of clergy being available 24 hrs a day and they know that the likelihood of them being completely ignored or rejected by the clergy is unlikely, no matter what the time of day. This presumption of assistance often leads to conflict where the clergy do not give the response that the offender is expecting or believes is their right, so violence may occur.
- 2.4 Clergy clearly meet the first criteria of the RAT in that it is very easy for offenders to meet in time and space with them. They are perceived to never be off duty and live in easily identifiable homes allowing the offender to arrive at any time of the day or night. The tradition of vicars always being available adds to the perception of assistance and finally, the fact that clergy are clearly identifiable (*clergy collars*) away from their place of work/home raises the risk of them meeting a motivated offender who uses violence as a method of achieving their aims.
- 2.5 The convergence of time and space between an offender and victim can be divided into two areas, predictable and non-predictable. Clergy who have a significant amount of predictable lifestyle can take steps to ensure that during these times they have 'guardians' present, or some form of overt security device such as a CCTV camera. More difficult is the unpredictable part of their lifestyle such as when they are walking in the street, cold calling on parishioners, shopping in Tescos or travelling on public transport. This is where training for clergy comes in to enable them to read the '*situational clues*' which will allow them to judge whether someone is a danger to them.

3. Motivated Offenders

- 3.1 If an offender is not motivated to violence then it simply will not occur. Motivation can be pre-meditated where the offender plans to extract some service (*usually money*) from the vicar and is prepared if necessary to use violence or aggression to achieve this aim, or the motivation is spontaneous where something the vicar says or does motivates the offender to use violence.
 - 3.2 There is an urban myth that clergy have some form of moral protection within society and that even criminals who use violence regularly would not attack a church person.
 - 3.3 As the churches' influence on the majority of society dwindles (*as shown by the significant downturn of attendance at church*) there is a generational gap on who would use violence against clergy. In the early to mid twenty first century (*probably up to the 1980's*) it was common for almost every person to attend church personally or to at least to be very aware of church through schools (including Sunday school). This, even if the experience wasn't very pleasant, did put some sort of moral limitation on the use of violence against clergy. Since the 1980's attendance in churches have dropped, the education system has concentrated on the understanding of all faiths which has diluted the respect of the Christian priest in society, and a knock on effect of this is that attacking a member of the clergy is seen by most criminals as no different to attacking a shopkeeper, robbing an old lady or any other member of society, if their own motivation demands this action.
 - 3.4 Some clergy will rationalise a confrontation with the view that most offenders can be persuaded from committing a violent act through rational reasoning. This is a classical theorist view that criminal behaviour can be deterred by the threat of fair and proportionate punishment ergo "I can talk them down". This theory is not held up in reality as the people who are prepared to use violence against clergy are often on the fringes of society where violence is common and using it is not a last resort but a method to be used if the offender thinks it will achieve the aim they require, or the violence is a method of punishing the member of the clergy for showing a lack of respect.
 - 3.5 There are six generic reasons why violence occurs. The offender is influenced by alcohol, is affected by drugs (*either high or they need drugs*), they are mentally ill, they are angry, they are fearful, or they are medically ill. The difficulty is there is rarely a clear cut reason why someone is violent, they will often be suffering from a number of the generic reasons. So this makes it very difficult to predict the motivation of the offender, especially during any confrontation.
- a) *Addicts* - Addicts often will rise late in the morning or early afternoon, they will often go and seek their first 'hit' of the day and then will roam in order to acquire the next 'hit' which is often needed by late afternoon or early evening. This is the period of highest risk for vicars when addicts are becoming more and more motivated as time goes on and they haven't found the required payment for their next 'hit'. As an addict becomes more desperate for their 'hit' they start

displaying situational clues that clergy should be able to recognise that the person has become a motivated offender and they are at risk of violence.

- b) *Mental Illness* - Mentally ill people generally are less of a problem than addicts. There are very few mentally ill people who are regularly violent as modern drugs and community care is becoming more competent. Normally, mentally ill people who use violence have not taken their medication or are having some sort of temporary mental illness that is not their normal behaviour. Mentally ill people, however, show some significant situational clues that allow clergy to identify that they are possible a motivated offender.
- c) *Anger* - when an offender is angry or afraid then they can easily become motivated to use violence against a vicar. Anger can be directed at the vicar personally, or it can be directed at what they represent (*ie God and/or the church.*)
- d) *Fear* - Fear is often linked with mental illness but it may be that the member of the clergy has caught someone in the act of committing an offence. Often the violence related to fear is spontaneous (*ie they need to escape*) and it can be disproportionate to what is actually occurring.
- e) *Medical Illness* - This is a very common problem which is often overlooked when looking at the situational clues that give a warning that someone is becoming a motivated offender. Someone who is in pain, someone who has suffered from a head injury, a stroke, epilepsy or diabetes are all people who can use violence (*albeit unintentionally sometimes!*) towards clergy. The situational clues of someone who is medically ill are often mixed up with someone who is drunk. However, someone who has fallen over and suffered trauma can use violence so clergy must look at the situational clues

3.6 There are those offenders who specifically target clergy homes and will often go from one to another through an area in the expectation that at least one member of the clergy will give them money. In urban areas especially this is can be an effective tactic as there is often no way of clergy communication with each other to alert them to this. Indeed, there is a marking system which the traditional 'gentlemen of the road' use to show which vicarages are generous when it comes to giving money and which vicarages you shouldn't bother to call at because they will not give money. Unfortunately, these marks are a local language which cannot be used elsewhere and there are actually a very small proportion of the people who visit vicarages who would understand these marks.

3.7 Generally speaking, however, these people become known to the vicar and they are much better at making the assessment of the likelihood of violence depending on the behaviour of the offender.

- 3.8 More difficult to deal with are the casual callers who are 'passing through'. These people are often spontaneous in their selection of a visit to the vicarage. Cohen and Fenson in the RAT theory used the acronym *VIVA* to describe the selection of a suitable target for a motivated offender;

V – value: the offender must be convinced that it is worth communicating with the victim in order that they get some value out of the conversation

I – Inertia : the target must not be able to easily escape the attentions of the offender.

V – Visibility : the target must be easily identifiable to the offender at the time that he becomes motivated to speak or deal with someone.

A – Access : the offender must be able to access the victim.

- 3.9 When *VIVA* is applied to clergy it explains some of the rationale for motivated offenders arriving on the vicarage doorstep.

Value – A motivated offender will have an expectation of assistance from the vicar, often this expectation is that of being given money

Inertia - Clergy in their homes are stuck on their doorstep, they cannot easily escape. Often there are other considerations preventing clergy from making an easy exit such as the presence of children in the vicarage.

Visibility - Vicarages are often easily identified through a sign on the wall or their proximity to the church. Also, clergy are often easily identifiable away from the church through their use of clergy collars or clerical clothing.

Access - Clergy are often easily accessible either through knocking on the front door of the vicarage or due to their presence in the church.

- 3.10 Akers (1997) observes that the RAT explains why people become victims but doesn't explain why some people commit crime and others do not. This is important when we consider who are the people most likely to commit violent acts against clergy and how do we develop good practice techniques when dealing with them.

- 3.11 The normal motivated offender is perceived predominantly to be a young male. This should not be taken as a definite but it is true that all of the clergy who have been murdered in the last ten years were all killed by young males. As young males are the most likely to commit crimes generally then this should not be a surprise, however, clergy need to consider that it is bad practice to focus on this group particularly, and ignore other groups. It should be remembered

that it is the behaviour of the person which is important in any confrontation, and not the age, dress or otherwise of the offender.

- 3.12 *The Rational Actor* - Hopkins Burke states "*that the Classical theorists had emphasised the rationally calculating, reasoning human being who could be deterred from choosing to commit criminal behaviour by the threat of a fair and proportionate punishment.*" and "*Criminal motivation or the predisposition of the offender was immaterial. The emphasis was now on deterrence and - if the person failed to heed that warning and was not to be deterred or scared off - punishment.*"
- 3.13 However, Hopkins Burke then goes on to challenge these statements which were essentially saying that as long as the crime could be prevented then the motivation of the offender is not important. Hopkins Burke says that "*the understanding of the motivation can lead to important crime model criminal justice intervention that promotes the detection and punishment of those offenders who cannot be deterred as the main priority.*"
- 3.14 When relating these theorist's comments to clergy violence we can consider that the motivation of the offender is important, and if the clergy involved in these confrontations can get information from the offender before the violence occurs then the chance of the assault occurring is reduced.
- 3.15 Good practice in this situation should be the encouragement of communication between the priest and the offender with some form of standard questioning that elicits the history and motivation of the offender presenting himself at the vicarage, or wherever the confrontation is taking place.
- 3.16 There are other situational clues that need to be taken into consideration when dealing with any person on the doorstep of the vicarage, or elsewhere.
- 3.17 *Situational Clues* - It has been highlighted in both Gabe's study and through the experience of Nick Tolson in Training Seminars that clergy have a problem with recognising what situational clues put them at risk. It is exceptionally rare for a motivated offender to use violence with no warning at all. Usually there is an extended communication between the victim and the offender which leads up to violence, it is during this time that clergy need to recognise the signs that they are at risk.
- 3.18 There can be a difference between the offender who goes into the church seeking assistance and the person who goes to the vicarage. Someone who is in need will have an expectation that there is 'someone' in a church who will give assistance or care for their need. They see the spire or tower of the church, which is often the highest architectural feature of a town or village and are attracted to it, being only distracted away by a more promising target. In most towns or villages

there are not any other targets to lure the offender away, therefore they become a focus of trouble.

- 3.19 These offenders once they enter the church will assess who is the most likely person to provide them with their requirements (*usually money*), if there is a member of the clergy present, they will be selected as the most likely candidate, and the confrontation will begin.
- 3.20 Those offenders who go to the vicarage can have a slightly different makeup to those who go directly to the church. Other than those who have been directed from the church or elsewhere to the vicarage, those who go directly to a vicarage will usually have experience of going to a clergy home which has been successful in the past. They will have an expectation of the result of their visit which when they feel it is not being achieved will resort to violence.
- 3.21 There are a small number of very dangerous offenders who will visit the vicarage with a religious purpose. These tend to be someone who has some sort of problem and they blame 'God' for this. The vicar is the representative of God on earth at that moment and therefore can be punished by the offender for God's failings. People who are motivated by this are often easily identified by the words that they use during the communication phase of the confrontation as well as other indicators shown by all people who may intend to use violence.
- 3.22 There are a few people who may target the priest from a religious crime point of view. Christian clergy do not seem to have become a target from other religious groups, even when they are based in an area where the majority of the population are not Christian. There are one or two incidents where Christian clergy have been verbally abused by non Christian gangs but these are rare and are usually fuelled by alcohol. It is a possible consideration for the future for clergy if the tactics of terrorists change, or more likely, that some incident which is perceived to be Christian vs. another faith, will occur and clergy will be targeted.
- 3.23 There are, however, some situational clues which commonly occur when any person is preparing to commit a violent act. These are divided into three sections which together add up to communication.
- 3.24 *Words* – these are the words that are actually spoken by the offender. Usually people will try and hide their real feelings. However, when people use swearing repetitively, threats, blaming God, racist comments etc, this is a clue that the person in front of you may have a tendency towards violence. In communication, the words that we speak represent about 7% of the total message they are giving us.
- 3.25 *Tone of voice* – this is a vital part of communication representing 30%. Irrespective of the language used the tone of voice assists us to identify the mood of the person speaking with us.

3.26 *Body Language* – This is the most important part of communication. The way that people behave is a clear indicator of motivation and intention, no matter what they are saying. Police officers are often said to have a sixth sense, but this is merely that they have great experience of people's body language and can often identify someone who is a risk to them early on. We know that most of body language is unconscious, ie the person who is motivated to violence will have no idea that they are sending signals that are obvious to those who pay attention to such things. Clergy tend not to deal with people who are violent in any regular way, so tend to ignore or not treat seriously any worries that they have regarding someone's body language. Part of the good practice guidelines will give an idiots guide to common body language messages that indicate that a situation is about to go out of control and may result in violence occurring.

4. Parishioners

4.1 Clergy homes are almost unique in today's society in being recognised as somewhere where people have an expectation of getting pastoral help. Many people expect that help to be practical, such as giving money. However, we know through Gabe's report that 48% of assaults on clergy come from parishioners. Parishioners in this case were people who are on the church record, ie they have actually registered as members of the church.

4.2 There has been no detailed study in the reasons why parishioners should be such a threat to clergy so we have to look at the circumstantial and anecdotal evidence that has been obtained by Nick Tolson through the 400 or so seminars that he has held over the last 8 years.

4.3 There is no doubt that clergy suffer from stress when they have confrontations through the normal course of their duties with parishioners. The PCC is the source of a lot of stress though normally this does not result in violence. However, there are occasions, and almost every member of the clergy Nick Tolson has spoken to confirms this, when the behaviour of some PCC members seem to cross over an invisible line and can be interpreted as violent. It is very unusual that this involved actual physical assault but from a harassment and abuse point of view, it seems to be relatively common. It seems that these parishioners consider the vicar to be fair game when it comes to abuse, and do not consider their actions to be violent in any way, despite the fact that the vicar has increased sickness rates and avoids certain individuals because they feel bullied.

4.4 Often in a parish are one or two people who can use violence as defined in footnote 2 above. These can be people who have a grudge against the church, the vicar themselves or God. The Vicar becomes the target of the abuse which can often take the form of anonymous letter writing to the bishop, attempts to discredit the vicar and accusations of improper behaviour. These are often long term problems that are seldom dealt with in a satisfactory manner according to those clergy who suffer from this sort of violence.

4.5 Gabe notes that clergy will normally talk to fellow clergy when they suffer a confrontation or violent incident which does not involve physical violence. This indicates a lack of access to

independent occupational health support or a lack of trust in the statutory powers. It is only in the most serious incidents that their 'employers' become involved and it is noted by Nick Tolson that clergy see this as a weakness on their part that they have to admit that they cannot deal with a situation. It is also noted that the responses of Dioceses, in general, tends to be ineffective and confused. Part of the good practice guidelines will include guidance on the response of Deaneries, Dioceses and others when a violent incident occurs.

5. Guardian Angels

- 5.1 In relation to Clergy this is probably one of the more important aspects of the Clergy Lifestyle theory as with only a minimal change to how clergy operate when at home, when in church and when visiting other people they can reduce the risk of violence significantly.
- 5.2 The third part of the Routine Activity Theory says that there must not be capable guardians present in order for the offender to use violence.
- 5.3 *Formal Guardians* - Most people think about formal guardians when talking about protection. These will include police officers, security guards and others engaged in security duties. When members of the public see these formal guardians present whether the police officer on the beat, or the security guard on the supermarket door, they feel safer and therefore the fear of crime falls.
- 5.4 Although formal guardians do not guarantee the absence of violence (a motivated offender with a gun might feel confident enough to take on an unarmed police officer) generally speaking they deter the average criminal from being violent by their presence.
- 5.5 In relation to clergy the formal guardian is not present except in very special circumstances. An example of this is Canterbury Cathedral who employ security guards to protect visitors and clergy. These formal guardians of the Cathedral ensure that on the odd occasion when someone is motivated to use violence, they are swiftly on the scene and able to subdue the offenders.
- 5.6 *Informal Guardians* - Informal guardians that are present in any community are very important. Felson (1998) has reached the conclusion "*that natural crime prevention and deterrence occurs in the informal control system, the quiet and natural method by which people prevent crime in the course of daily life.*"
- 5.7 In other words ordinary people such as members of the congregation, family members, fellow clergy, churchworkers or even strangers are the most likely capable guardians.
- 5.8 This does not mean that these people would be expected to restrain anyone who is being violent but merely by being present, whether through accident or design, reduces the chances of violence to a very low statistical probability.

- 5.9 Sometimes though, an informal guardian can act like a formal guardian. Recently on a trip to Northern Ireland the author spoke with a number of clergy who work in some of the most difficult areas of Belfast where the para-military organisations both catholic and protestant control certain areas. The members of the clergy said that the gangs left them alone as long as they asked permission to enter certain estate areas. On the odd occasion that clergy are abused or attacked in Belfast the criminal gangs have offered to 'kneecap' the offender on the behalf of the church!
- 5.10 Clergy need to look closely at their lifestyles to identify the times when guardians are most likely to be present. When in the church during services or during other activities the possibility of a guardian being present is improved. However, clergy need to identify ways of ensuring someone else is present when they are in a building. The person does not necessarily have to be aware that they are acting as a guardian but it is important that the member of the clergy is.
- 5.11 Very serious consideration should be given to having a formal arrangement for clergy to be accompanied by someone whenever they are in the church for whatever reason.
- 5.12 When looking at other times when clergy are at risk of violence, some thought should be given to how they react at particular issues.
- 5.13 The vicarage is identified as a potential confrontation flash point so some thought must be given to how clergy respond to the caller at the door. For clergy who are married or have someone else living in the house with them this is not always a problem as this increases the likelihood of someone being present to act as a guardian. In this situation it must be made clear to the potential offender that there is someone else present through either the person making themselves known or by the vicar speaking to that person. This gives the message to the potential offender that there is someone else present which should enable them to act as a guardian.
- 5.14 Having a dog is not considered to be an effective guardian as the offender will not see them as a threat. If violence is used it is unlikely that the dog will come to the assistance of the vicar, and it is not a very good witness to identify the offender!
- 5.15 *Mechanical Guardians* – Clergy who are single have a particular issue with having someone else present in the house when people come calling at the door. It is unreasonable and impractical to ask other people to be present all the time in the clergy home. Therefore the second part of the guardian aspect of the RAT theory comes into play. This states that an effective guardian or protective device has to be absent in order for the violence to occur. It is reasonable to assume that any protective device has to be effective in order to deter the offender.
- 5.16 An effective protective device is one that causes the offender to believe that they will be detected even if no effective guardian is present. It has to be noted, however, that a device that becomes operational after an offender becomes violent is not effective. For example, if a vicar has an

audible personal attack alarm that rings a siren when they press a button, this is not effective because the attack has already happened and the effectiveness of the response to the audible alarm is not assured. However, the new personal attack alarms which are available allow the monitoring station to speak with the vicar should they set the alarm off. This then becomes an effective guardian as the offender is now aware that there is a second person listening to the confrontation, someone who can call assistance should it be required. These types of alarms are only effective if they are pressed before the violence is used as once an offender has hit a person they have crossed an invisible line and the fact that they are being observed will have less of an impact.

- 5.17 There are other effective mechanical guardians that may be of assistance to the vicar. CCTV is often seen as the solution to many problems. However, for CCTV to be effective in a vicarage it has to be overt, and the offender has to be reasonably sure that the camera is operated effectively. A sign on the door of the vicarage stating that the CCTV is monitored may be an effective way to get the message across to the potential offender that the vicar is security aware. Linked with other crime reduction measures the CCTV can become an effective guardian for the purpose of reducing violence.

6. Clergy Lifestyles

- 6.1 In order to prevent violence Clergy need to look carefully at their lifestyles and try and eradicate any area which puts them in an unacceptable risk situation. A number of clergy have stated that sometimes they have to place themselves in a risk situation and the author acknowledges this. However, it is when the risk taking becomes a habit that it becomes more of a danger and then clergy have to take steps to break the habit.
- 6.2 If a lifestyle change is accompanied by an improvement in Vicarage security then the risk to clergy is reduced significantly.
- 6.3 *Lifestyle change* – There are some important policies that clergy need to follow in order to reduce the likelihood of violence.
- a) *Entry to clergy home* – Generally speaking no unknown person or person who has previously been identified as a potential offender (*or actual offender!*) should be invited into the clergy home, and certainly not if there is not a suitable guardian present. If the member of the clergy decides that the need of the person is urgent and they should be invited in then they need to ensure that a suitable guardian is contacted immediately to come to the clergy home asap. Should no suitable guardian be available then the member of the clergy should not allow the person into the home but ask them to return at a suitable time in order to meet with the member of clergy. This can seem uncaring, but the risk of having someone in the clergy home whilst no suitable guardian is available is too much. Very few problems are truly life or death situations, and if the clergy thinks this is the case then they should contact the statutory guardians to assist them. (*ie ambulance*

service or police) Ministers should ask the visitor for their details using a form of some sort. If the person is of that parish then the minister can make an appointment to visit the person at their own home (*or where the person generally sleeps if they are homeless*) ensuring they are accompanied by a suitable guardian. If the person is from another parish then the Minister should contact the vicar who has pastoral oversight of the person to ensure continuity of care.

- b) *Visiting other people's homes* – A minister should not cold call on any house. If someone new has entered a parish then contact should be made through phone or other medium before the visit, this prevents people from reacting defensively when they see a priest at the door. When contacting people to arrange a visit the minister should always try and ascertain who is going to be present in the house. If someone who can act as a guardian is going to be present (*husband, wife, children etc*) then the visit is of less risk. If it appears that no-one is going to be present, and the clergy is not aware of the history of the person they are visiting, then they should always take someone with them to act as a guardian. If the visit involves confidentiality then the guardian does not have to remain in the room with the minister and the person they are visiting, but can remain nearby in the kitchen or other room. Their presence nearby is good enough to act as a guardian.
- c) *In the church* – if an arrangement is made for a minister to meet with someone in a church then it is vital to ensure that a guardian is present. The chance that violence will occur during a church service is minimal as there are usually a good number of people present to act as the guardian. However, often the offender will ask to talk in private with the vicar and thus removing them from the guardianship, like taking them into a vestry or elsewhere. The minister must make sure that someone is told that they are going to speak in a private area, that person then becomes the guardian even if they are not actually in the room with the minister and the offender.

7. Summary

- 7.1 The Routine Activity Theory has implications for clergy and can be applied effectively. It involved having to make some changes in their lifestyle and that of any other person who is living in the clergy home. Meeting a motivated offender in a space where violence can occur and where there is no guardian to protect them is a difficult situation for any person, but especially for a member of the clergy whose natural instinct is to try and help. Clergy need to act early to prevent the situation from getting out of control. Getting a guardian there, or asking the person to come back later are simple control measures. Preparing for the confrontation is probably the best way to ensure that clergy will not be injured. The preparation can include improving the physical security of the vicarage is vital, and attending a training course to improve their conflict management skills. Each one of these things will reduce the risk of violence. No training or equipment will ever make clergy invulnerable, the nature of their job means that they are on the front line and will meet people who are motivated to use violence. The fact that they are priests does not mean that they are immune from violence due to the lack of understanding of their role and the lack of respect from certain parts of society.

7.2 It is vital that senior clergy, such as Bishops and Archdeacons, lead by example to ensure that they follow the Clergy Lifestyle Theory. This will encourage the clergy in their care to take the steps required to keep them safe. Clergy must also take positive steps to reduce the risk to themselves as they are an example to their communities and some people are influenced by their actions. If clergy take action to remain safe so will some parts of their communities.

Bibliography

Hopkins Burke, Pollock; (2004); *A tale of Two Anomies – some observations on the contribution of (sociological) criminological theory in explaining hate crime motivation*; Internet Journal of Criminology.

Cohen, L.E. and Felson, (1979) '*Social Inequality and Predatory Criminal Victimization: an Exposition and Test of a Formal Theory*', American Sociological Review,

Hopkins Burke, R.D, (2001) '*An Introduction to Criminological Theory*', Willan Press

Gabe et al, (2001), '*Violence against Professionals in the Community*', Royal Holloway

Hopkins Burke, RD. (2005) *An Introduction to Criminology*, Cullumpton : Willan

Internet

www.nationalchurchwatch.com/publications; July 2007

www.homeoffice.gov.uk; July 2007

www.pam.com; July 2007

Appendix A

Physical Security Recommendation for Clergy Homes

Front Door

1. You must be able to see who is outside the door

- there must be a spy hole or cctv fitted

Reason

- You should have the choice of whether you wish to open the door or not;
- You need to see who is there in case they have a weapon or are behaving inappropriately.

Method

- Spy holes can be fitted very easily to solid doors. Modern designs mean that you do not have to put your eye up to the holes (*they use large prisms*);
- CCTV can be used where putting a spy hole in is not practical or if you want to record your visitors (*recommended*).

2. The person outside should not be able to see in

Reason

- You need to have the choice as to whether to open the door or not
- If the person does have a weapon or is acting inappropriately you do not want them to know you are there

Method

- Not an issue on solid doors, with glass panels or double glazed doors then one way security plastic can be used (*This allows you to see out but the person outside cannot see in*) The plastic is sticky and very easy to fit

3. The front door should not have a letter box

Reason

- letter boxes allow people to see in
- letter boxes allow people to 'fish' for car keys etc left near the door;
- letter boxes allow items to be placed into the home, such as petrol, fireworks and burning paper

Method

Preferably seal or remove all letter boxes and have a separate letter box on the wall next to the front door

Alternatively, use a letter guard which prevents anyone looking in also means that all letters, items etc drop directly down (*preferably into a box*)

If a letter box is in situ (*or even if it is not!*) then a smoke detector should always be placed immediately next to the front door

4. There must be a method of Communicating with someone outside without opening the door

Reason

- The member of the clergy may wish to speak with the person at the door without opening it, speaking through the door may not be appropriate as neither person may be able to hear what is being said causing frustration;

Method

- Modern intercoms are wireless and easy to install.
- Intercoms can incorporate CCTV which increase the 'value added' part of security on the front door

5. Front Doors should be security doors made to resist unauthorised entry

Reason

- Most burglaries in a home are made through the front door
- A majority of clergy violence occurs on the doorstep so a door that can withstand someone kicking it is vital
- The front door provides a barrier either before an incident takes place or if during an incident the member of the clergy decides they need to protect themselves (*ie they need to shut the front door!*)

Method

- All front doors should reach the European Standard ENV 1627

(This means that the door will withstand assault with crowbars for 5 minutes, withstand pressure on the lock of 600 kg, and withstand pressure on the corners of 300 kg)

- Doors need to be at least 44mm thick and should have a 5 lever lock which complies with British Standard 3621 : 2004;
- The door should also have a separate 'Yale' type lock fitted to ensure that the door will stay shut if slammed in an emergency;
- The front door should have hinge bolts or similar fitted which slide into recesses on the hanging post of the door frame and hold the door in place even if the hinges fail;
- Other security

If a front door is of the double glazing plastic type then very serious consideration should be given to replacing the door and frame with a solid security door. Several companies provide these types of door.

6. Extra strengthening options

D-Locking N Latch: This is an extremely simple device which provides complete safety if someone tries to kick the door in. With one flip the latch is closed and seals the door to the door frame. It is an alternative to the security chain.

London Bar : This is a strip of metal that protects the lock side of the door preventing anyone from kicking or prising the door open with an implement. It is a vital part of the reinforcement of the door and completely invisible.

Birmingham Bar: This does the same job as the London bar except it protects the hinge side of the door, which is often the weak point in a door.

7. Burglar alarms

All clergy homes **MUST** have a burglar alarm that has personal attack alarms incorporated into the system. There are a huge variety of alarms that are available but below are a few requirements for any alarm;

1. When activated the alarm must inform someone that it has activated.

Having a 'bells' only system is pointless. Most intruders know that the police will not attend an audible alarm therefore they have time to continue with the burglary.

2. The personal attack buttons **MUST** be monitored and **MUST** be silent.

If a member of the clergy has operated a personal attack alarm then they need help. Having an audible alarm merely antagonises the offender and will not scare them off as they are probably suffering from some form of addiction or illness and a bell or siren will have no affect on their actions. The police are required to attend a manually operated alarm within 8 mins (and are usually quicker!).

3. There should be a personal attack alarm by the front door, in the study and upstairs in the main bedroom as a minimum.

This is to give the member of the clergy or their family the maximum chance possible to set off the alarm should they need to.

4. Alarms should be able to be set in zones.

This allows for the downstairs (or the perimeter) to be alarmed during the night, also if there are any pets in the house the room where they are can be isolated whilst leaving the rest of the house alarmed.

5. The burglar alarm should also be able to be linked with smoke detectors.

This allows for assistance to be called if the house is empty with the alarm set should a fire occur either accidentally or deliberately.

Technology has rapidly forged forward with regard to burglar alarms. There are a huge number of companies that are in this sector which means that prices have fallen hugely. The monitoring of a burglar alarm should cost no more than £20 a month (*and quite possibly a lot cheaper than that!*) There are many alternatives to the traditional burglar alarms which may be suitable, for example a burglar that sends texts to up to ten mobile phones, alarms that allow you to listen in through your mobile phone to see if there is an intruder and even allows you to talk with them!

The most important part of any system, however, is the personal attack alarm. Clergy can be trained when to use the alarms (*ie before a situation has become violent*), the front door can be designed to prevent the violent offender from kicking it in, but in the end the member of the clergy needs the police there to assist them. Therefore the personal attack alarm HAS to be monitored and will have to conform to EN 50131 – 1, according to the scheme described in PD 6662 : 2004.

8. Clergy Home Perimeter

The clergy home will normally have two perimeters, an inner and an outer. There are several things that should be present to assist in providing safety for clergy. Not all will be possible in some clergy homes but an attempt should be made to install as many of the features as possible.

Outer Perimeter – this is the perimeter which faces onto the road/public area or the neighbours property.

- Boundary – the boundary should be clearly marked by either a fence or hedge. There should be no point where the boundary can be breached by squeezing through a gap.
Reason – although the boundary fence/hedge is easily climbed by someone who is determined it is a physiological barrier to the casual passer by and opportunist. The perimeter MUST be well maintained which tells a potential intruder that the owner of the property is concerned about the perimeter and therefore will probably be concerned for the home as well. (ie it will have security)
- Gates – the driveway/entrance to the property should always have a gate fitted.
Reason – the gate is a physiological barrier for those who are looking for trouble. To open it is to make a definite decision to enter into someone's property. If the gate is left open then it is an invitation to enter the property. The gate can be used by the member of the clergy to indicate whether they are welcoming visitors at that particular time or not. It does not stop people entering but gets them in a frame of mind which can direct the way they operate once they are on the property.
- Gravel – driveways should be lined with gravel or similar so that a silent approach to the property is impossible.

Reason – It is a really useful indicator to the occupant that someone is approaching and it shows the visitor/intruder that people know you are coming!

- There should be no 'vicarage' sign or any other indication that this is a clergy home.
Reason – Opportunist thieves or troublemakers will often go for what they perceive to be the weakest property in an area, and that is often perceived to be the vicarage. Those that need to know where the vicarage is (ie the parishioners) will know where the clergy home is, those that don't can ring the number on the parish notice board to arrange a meeting.

Inner Perimeter – this is the area that separates the front of the property from the back of the property.

- It must be impossible for anyone to go from the front of the house to the back of the house without going through a gate.
Reason – the rear of the clergy home is private. The gate should have a sign with 'private' on it to make it clear that there is no entry. If someone subsequently enters the area then they are a trespasser and the clergy can legitimately ask the person to leave immediately or neighbours can call the police should they see someone entering into this area.
- The gate should have a lock on it to prevent entry.
Reason – it should be a barrier to prevent entry and require the person to climb over it in order to enter which shows criminal intent rather than it being just an 'accident'.

The point of this security is to direct the visitor to the main strongpoint of the house, which should be the front door. Security should be concentrated at this point and should be overt in nature. (eg a cctv camera) This gives a clear message to anyone who may be motivated to use violence that the person within is security aware and it also provides real and practical security to the member of the clergy and their family who may need to use it. Violence can occur randomly and at any time therefore investing in these minimum standards will reduce the chances of a confrontation turning into a violent incident where serious injury or even death may occur.

9. The Clergy Study

The Clergy Study / Office should have a separate entrance to the main home entrance.

Reason : This clearly separates the boundary between home and work. It provides a psychological barrier for both clergy and the visitor to show where work finishes and home begins. No-one should be invited into the home area unless it is for a non-work related reason as per any other person inviting someone into their home. (ie it is a social reason)

Points to note :

- The clergy study door should not be closed completely when interviewing someone. It is important that other people in the house are able to act as guardians should it become necessary.
- It may be that the vicar feels that the door should be shut for confidentiality or noise reasons but if they feel that the situational clues are warning them that someone is becoming a motivated offender then the vicar should immediately open the study door in order to create the perception of guardianship, even if there is no-one in the vicarage.
- Should it be impractical for there to be an outside entrance into the study then steps should be taken to create a barrier between home and work area. This can be as simple as a curtain across the hallway, or even a gate guard placed across the area where people are not allowed to go.
- Consideration needs to be given if someone asks to use the toilet. In an ideal world all clergy homes would have a toilet near the study, but if there is not one then people should be escorted to the toilet, and then escorted back to the study when they have finished. This gives a clear message that in a home area the person will always be escorted.
- All clergy work areas should have facilities to make refreshments in the area. The vicar should not have to leave anyone alone in order to make coffee, nor should they invite people into the kitchen whilst they make the refreshments. A kettle and water should always be available in the work area for this task. It is another psychological message that there is a definite division between work and home.